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Abstract
A game-theoretic setting provides a mathematical basis for analysis of strategic interaction
among competing agents and provides insights into both classical and quantum decision theory
and questions of strategic choice. An outstanding mathematical question, is to understand the
conditions under which a classical game-theoretic setting can be transformed to a quantum
game, and under which conditions there is an equivalence. In this paper, we consider quantum
games as those that allow non-factorizable probabilities. We discuss two approaches for
obtaining a non-factorizable game and study the outcome of such games. We demonstrate
how the standard version of a quantum game can be analyzed as a non-factorizable game and
determine the limitations of our approach.
Introduction
The realization has now emerged [1–3] that the processing of information cannot be separated from
the underlying fundamental physics and that the physical aspects of information processing must
be taken into consideration. This has led to a new understanding of the information processing,
cryptography, and the methods and techniques used for communication that are based on the
rules of quantum theory [4].
A venue where information plays a central role is in the established branch of mathematics
called game theory [5–7] that provides the necessary mathematical tools, methods, and solution
concepts for the analysis of conflict. The understanding of games is based on some fundamental
assumptions relating to what information is available to each participating player at a particular
stage of the game. The finding that physical aspects can have crucial role in information processing
has natural implications for player strategies and the considerations of underlying fundamental
physics become important for game theory. Such questions have led to creation of the research
area of quantum games [8–70]. What these studies have shown is that quantum strategies can
result in outcomes that often defy our classical intuition.
The emergent field of quantum game theory is rapidly growing [72]. Quantum game theory
has two branches: (i) games based on quantum coin tossing that explore the theory of quantum
walks, and (ii) strategic games, in the von Neumann sense, which explore quantum decision
spaces in situations of conflict. There are a number of directions that have motivated research in
quantum game theory. First and foremost, it must be recognized that the field is a fundamental
exploration of scientific curiosity and that it provides a glimpse into quantum dynamics. Quantum
games provide mathematical settings for exploring competing interactions e.g. between classical
and quantum agents [8, 14, 50], between players in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game [9, 10, 40, 46],
multiplayer quantum games [12,19,28,29,38,39,43,56,62], interactions on quantum networks [53,
54,63], to name a few. Moreover, a number of authors are using a game-theoretic setting to explore
the possibility of new quantum algorithms and protocols [8, 53, 71, 73, 74]. The area of quantum
auctions [75–77] is an example of this, providing new motivation for quantum computational and
quantum network hardware. Thus far, a number of simpler quantum games have been implemented
in hardware, demonstrating future promise [20, 33, 39, 44, 60, 78].
The speed with which new quantum technologies are emerging suggests that soon it would be
usual to take full advantage of quantum theory, and using quantum strategies, in order to beat
an opposing player at some realistic game that uses quantum technology [50]. Also, there are
suggestions that quantum games can potentially provide new insights into the rise of complexity
and self-organization at the molecular level where the rules are dictated by quantum mechanics
[9, 48].
In game theory, some of the simplest games to analyze are the bimatrix games. In the area
of quantum games, a well known quantization scheme for bimatrix games was proposed by Eisert
et al. [9]. In this scheme, the players’s strategies or actions, are particular local unitary trans-
formations performed on an initial maximally entangled state |ψi〉 in 2 ⊗ 2 Hilbert space. After
the players’ actions, the quantum state passes through an unentangling gate and thereafter is
called the final state
∣∣ψf〉. This state is subsequently measured using Stern-Gerlach type detec-
tors generating four quantum probabilities [4]. Players’ payoff relations are expressed in terms of
the payoff entries of the corresponding bimatrix and the obtained quantum probabilities. Some
experimental realizations of quantum games are described in Refs. [20, 44, 60]. The measurement
basis for the final state
∣∣ψf〉 is defined [9,10] by associating pure classical strategies of the players
with the four basis vectors of the two-qubit quantum state. Players’ payoff relations contain four
quantum probabilities obtained by projecting the final quantum state onto the basis vectors and
are expressed in terms of players’ local unitary transformations and the projection postulate of
quantum mechanics.
The consideration of four quantum probabilities in the players’ payoff relations leads one to
ask whether the payoff relations in the quantum game can be described as mixed-strategy payoff
relations in the classical game. This is the case when quantum probabilities are factorizable and
then one can express quantum probabilities in terms of players’ mixed strategies. The relations
describing factorizability of quantum probabilities are a set of equations that link players’ mixed
strategies to a probability distribution on players’ payoffs.
A set of quantum probabilities can be non-factorizable and thus cannot be obtained from the
players’ mixed strategies. A quantum game can then be described as the game in which non-
factorizable probabilities are permitted. Approaching a quantum game from this perspective, this
paper presents two approaches in obtaining games with non-factorizable probabilities. In our
first approach, factorizability is controlled by an external parameter k ∈ [0, 1] in the sense that
assigning k = 0 results in the factorizable game whereas assigning k 6= 0 leads to a non-factorizable
game. We then ask whether a general quantum probability distribution can be described in this
way. In our second approach, we reexpess the players’ payoffs relations in a form that allows us
to obtain a non-factorizble game directly from the factorizable game by defining a function of
players’ strategies that satisfies certain constraints.
Two-player quantum games
Consider a symmetric bimatrix game [5–7]
Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S′
1
S′
2
(α, α) (β, γ)
(γ, β) (δ, δ)
(1)
where α, β, γ, and δ are real numbers. Assume that Alice’s and Bob’s mixed strategies are p,
q ∈ [0, 1], respectively, at which their payoffs can be written as
ΠA(p, q) = αpq + βp(1− q) + γ(1− p)q + δ(1 − p)(1− q),
ΠB(p, q) = αpq + γp(1− q) + β(1− p)q + δ(1 − p)(1− q). (2)
A Nash equilibrium (NE) consists of the pair (p∗, q∗) of strategies such that no player has any
motivation to unilaterally deviate from it. The game’s Nash inequalities take the form
ΠA(p
∗, q∗)−ΠA(p, q
∗) ≥ 0, ΠB(p
∗, q∗)−ΠB(p
∗, q) ≥ 0, (3)
which take the following form for the game defined by matrix (1)
[(α − β − γ + δ)q∗ + (β − δ)] (p∗ − p) ≥ 0,
[(α− β − γ + δ)p∗ + (β − δ)] (q∗ − q) ≥ 0, (4)
that gives the classical mixed strategy description of the matrix game (1).
Now consider the game (1) when played in Eisert et al.’s quantization scheme [9, 10]. The
scheme uses two qubits to play a quantum version of the game (1), whose quantum state is in
2⊗2 dimensional Hilbert space. In view of the game (1), a measurement basis for quantum state of
two qubits is chosen as |S1S
′
1〉 , |S1S
′
2〉 , |S2S
′
1〉 , |S2S
′
2〉. An entangled initial quantum state |ψi〉 is
obtained by using a two-qubit entangling gate Jˆ i.e. |ψi〉 = Jˆ |S1S
′
1
〉 where Jˆ = exp {iγS2 ⊗ S
′
2
/2}
and γ ∈ [0, π/2] is a measure of the game’s entanglement. For a separable or product game γ = 0
whereas for a maximally entangled game γ = π/2. The scheme considers the initial state being a
maximally entangled state |ψi〉. Players perform their local unitary transformations UˆA and UˆB
from two sets of unitary transformations
U(θ) =
(
cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2)
)
(5)
U(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos(θ/2) sin(θ/2)
- sin(θ/2) e−iφ cos(θ/2)
)
, (6)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/2. These actions change the initial maximally entangled state
|ψi〉 to (UˆA ⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |S1S
′
1
〉 which then is passed through an untangling gate Jˆ† and the state of
the game changes to the final state i.e.
∣∣ψf〉 = Jˆ†(UˆA⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |S1S′1〉. The state ∣∣ψf〉 is measured
in the basis |S1S
′
1
〉 , |S1S
′
2
〉 , |S2S
′
1
〉 , |S2S
′
2
〉 and using the quantum probability rule, the players’
payoffs are obtained as
ΠA(UˆA, UˆB) = α
∣∣〈S1S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + β ∣∣〈S1S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 + γ ∣∣〈S2S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + δ ∣∣〈S2S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 ,
ΠB(UˆA, UˆB) = α
∣∣〈S1S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + γ ∣∣〈S1S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 + β ∣∣〈S2S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + δ ∣∣〈S2S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 .
(7)
The NE for the quantum game consists of a pair (Uˆ∗A, Uˆ
∗
B) of local unitary transformations that
are obtained from the inequalities
ΠA(Uˆ
∗
A, Uˆ
∗
B)−ΠA(UˆA, Uˆ
∗
B) ≥ 0, ΠB(Uˆ
∗
A, Uˆ
∗
B)−ΠB(Uˆ
∗
A, UˆB) ≥ 0. (8)
That is, the NE consists a pair of two-parameter unitary transformations (6), corresponding to
the two players, such that neither player is left with any motivation to deviate from it. For
α = 3, β = 0, γ = 5, δ = 1 the matrix (1) gives the game of Prisoners’ Dilemma for which a
Pareto-optimal NE is obtained as [9]
Qˆ = UˆA(0, π/2) = UˆB(0, π/2) (9)
at which the players’ payoffs are ΠA(Qˆ, Qˆ) = ΠB(Qˆ, Qˆ) = 3. Thus the quantum strategy Qˆ ∼
Uˆ(0, π/2) emerges as the new equilibrium, when both players have access to the two-parameter
set (6) of unitary 2⊗ 2 operators.
Benjamin and Hayden [13] observed that when their two-parameter set is extended to include
all local unitary operations (i.e. all of SU(2)) the strategy Qˆ does not remain an equilibrium. They
showed that in the full space of deterministic quantum strategies there exists no equilibrium for
the quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma. Also, they observed that the set (6) of two-parameter quantum
strategies is not closed under composition, although this closure is the necessary requirement for
any set of quantum strategies. It can be explained as follows. Eisert et al. [9, 10] permitted both
players the same strategy set but introduced an arbitrary constraint into that set. This amounts
to permitting a certain strategy while forbidding the logical counter strategy which one would
intuitively expect to be equally allowed. Benjamin and Hayden showed [13] that Qˆ emerges as
the ideal strategy only because of restricting the strategy set arbitrarily.
Not withstanding the above observations, we note that in the two-player quantum game,
pairs of unitary transformations are players’ strategies that are mapped to a set of four quantum
probabilities that are normalized to 1 and in terms of which the players’ payoff relations are
expressed. This mapping is achieved via the quantum probability rule [4] that obtains a quantum
probability by squaring the modulus of the projections of the final quantum state to a basis state
in the Hilbert space. This mapping re-expresses the four quantum probabilities in terms of the
pair of players’ unitary transformations. This re-expression opens up the route to finding Nash
equilibria of the game as pairs of unitary transformations. In the following, we revise quantization
of a two-player game, discuss a factorizable game, and present the two approaches that lead to
obtaining a non-factorizable game.
Factorizability of a set of quantum probabilities
We notice that the payoff relations (7) can be written as
ΠA(UˆA, UˆB) = αǫ1 + βǫ2 + γǫ3 + δǫ4,
ΠB(UˆA, UˆB) = αǫ1 + γǫ2 + βǫ3 + δǫ4, (10)
where
ǫ1 =
∣∣〈S1S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 , ǫ2 = ∣∣〈S1S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 ,
ǫ3 =
∣∣〈S2S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 , ǫ4 = ∣∣〈S2S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 , (11)
are four quantum probabilities obtained using the quantum probability rule i.e. projecting the
final quantum state
∣∣ψf〉 of the game to the four basis vectors |S1S′1〉 , |S1S′2〉 , |S2S′1〉 , |S2S′2〉.
The probabilities ǫi are normalized i.e.
Σ4i=1ǫi = 1. (12)
Comparing the payoff relations in the classical game (2) and in the quantum game (10), we
notice that the payoff relations in the quantum game can be reduced to the payoff relations in
the classical game when probabilities ǫi are factorizable. Probabilities ǫi are factorizable when
for a given set of values assigned in range [0, 1] to probabilities ǫi, we can find two probabilities
p, q ∈ [0, 1] such that ǫi can be written in terms of p and q as
ǫ1 = pq, ǫ2 = p(1− q), ǫ3 = (1− p)q, ǫ4 = (1 − p)(1− q). (13)
That is, in the classical mixed-strategy version of the two-player game, the four probabilities ǫi
appearing in the payoff relations (2) are re-expressed in terms of players’ strategic variables p and
q via the factorizability conditions (13). If this is the case for the probabilities ǫi then we can
associate the probabilities p and q to the players Alice and Bob, respectively, so that the payoff
relations in the quantum game (10) are interpreted as corresponding to a mixed-strategy classical
game i.e.
ΠA(UˆA, UˆB) = ΠA(p, q), ΠB(UˆA, UˆB) = ΠB(p, q), (14)
with p and q satisfying the factorizability relations (13). In (13) ǫi represent not just a specific
set of four numbers in [0, 1] that add up to 1, but the entirety of such four numbers that can
be generated by the quantum mechanical setup used for playing a quantum game. As it can be
seen from the Eq. (10), in Eisert et al’s scheme, the full range of the players’ payoffs become
accessible by giving players access to unitary transformations. In other words, a pair of unitary
transformations results in a normalized set of four probabilities and Nash inequalities lead us to
obtaining a pair of unitary transformations as a NE.
Games with non-factorizable probabilities
Quantum probabilities ǫi, however, may not be factorizable in the sense described by Eq. (13).
That is, the measurement stage of a quantum game can result in such probabilities ǫi (0 ≤ ǫi ≤ 1)
that one cannot find p, q ∈ [0, 1] so that Eqs. (13) are satisfied. Viewing the payoff relations (10)
from this probabilistic viewpoint, it then seems natural to ask whether we can obtain the payoffs
(10) by simply removing the factorizability relations (13) and if this is the case then what are the
possibly new outcomes of the game. A quantum game allows obtaining sets of non-factorizable
probabilities and in this paper we look at the role of non-factorizable probabilities on the outcome
of a game. This can also be stated as follows. Considering Eqs. (10,14), we can describe the
factorizable game as the one for which
ΠA(p, q) = αǫ1 + βǫ2 + γǫ3 + δǫ4, ΠB(p, q) = αǫ1 + γǫ2 + βǫ3 + δǫ4, (15)
where Σ4i=1ǫi = 1 and the probabilities ǫi are related to players’s strategies p and q via the
factorizability relations (13). In the following, we consider two approaches in obtaining non-
factorizable probabilities.
The first approach
Our first approach considers an external parameter k that determines whether the probabilities
ǫi (0 ≤ i ≤ 4) are factorizable or not. For this, we consider the following probability distribution
ǫ1 = (2k − 1)
2pq, ǫ2 = (1− k)p(1− q) + kq(1− p),
ǫ3 = (1− k)q(1 − p) + kp(1− q), ǫ4 = 4k(1− k)pq + (1 − p)(1− q). (16)
It can be confirmed that for k in the range [0, 1] we have 0 ≤ ǫi ≤ 1 and that probabilities ǫi are
normalized according to the Eq. (12). When k = 0 the distribution (16) reduces to the factorizable
distribution of the Eq. (13). However, when k is non-zero, the probability distribution (16) is not
factorizable. Using the payoff relations (15), we now obtain the payoffs for Alice and Bob for the
distribution (16) as
ΠA(p, q, k) = α(2k − 1)
2pq + β [(1− k)p(1− q) + kq(1− p)]
+γ [(1− k)q(1− p) + kp(1− q)] + δ [4k(1− k)pq + (1− p)(1− q)] ,
ΠB(p, q, k) = α(2k − 1)
2pq + γ [(1− k)p(1− q) + kq(1− p)]
+β [(1− k)q(1− p) + kp(1− q)] + δ [4k(1− k)pq + (1 − p)(1− q)] .
(17)
The NE strategy pair (p∗, q∗) is then obtained from the inequalities
{[
α(1− 2k)2 − β − γ + δ {1 + 4k(1− k)}
]
q∗ + (β − δ)− k(β − γ)
}
(p∗ − p) ≥ 0,{[
α(1 − 2k)2 − β − γ + δ {1 + 4k(1− k)}
]
p∗ + (β − δ)− k(β − γ)
}
(q∗ − q) ≥ 0.
(18)
Now, for the Prisoners’ Dilemma game considered above, we have α = 3, β = 0, γ = 5, δ = 1 and
these reduce the above NE conditions to
{−1− q + k [5− 8q(1− k)]} (p∗ − p) ≥ 0,
{−1− p+ k [5− 8p(1− k)]} (q∗ − q) ≥ 0. (19)
For k = 0 these relations give the NE in the classical factorizable game i.e. (p∗, q∗) = (0, 0) at
which the players payoffs are obtained as ΠA,B(p
∗, q∗, k) = ΠA,B(0, 0, 0) = 1.
Now consider the case when k = 1 for which we find the NE being (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) and the
players’ payoffs are obtained as ΠA,B(p, q, k) = ΠA,B(1, 1, 1) = 3. These payoffs are same as
obtained in the maximally entangled quantum game in Eisert et al’s scheme [9] with both players
playing the quantum strategy Qˆ defined in Eq. (9).
However, we notice that the probability distribution in Eq. (16) is not as general as a quantum
probability distribution can be within a quantum game. This is because for (16) to be a quantum
probability distribution it is required to obey only the normalization constraint (12). Although the
probability distribution (16) is normalized it also obeys other restrictions because of its particular
form and the way it is defined. This can also be stated as follows. Whereas the probability
distribution (16) is normalized, not every normalized quantum probability distribution will have
this form. That is, there can be quantum probability distributions that cannot be written in
the same form as the distribution (16). However, in spite of these limitations, the probability
distribution (16) demonstrates the effect of a non-factorizable probability distribution on the
outcome of a game. It also produces the classical game as a special case. In the following, we
present a second approach that defines a probability distribution using a function of players’
strategies p and q that is subject to certain constraints.
The second approach
At this stage, we notice that when ǫi are factorizable in the sense described by Eqs. (13) that give
the relationship between p, q and ǫi. Using these relations, the players’ strategies p and q can be
expressed in terms of probabilities ǫi as
p = ǫ1 + ǫ2, q = ǫ1 + ǫ3, (20)
and using Eqs. (11), we can write Eqs. (20) as
p =
∣∣〈S1S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈S1S′2 | ψf〉∣∣2 ,
q =
∣∣〈S1S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈S2S′1 | ψf〉∣∣2 . (21)
Knowing that p and q are the players’ strategies, and each player has the freedom to play whatever
s/he likes, the strategies p and q are considered to be independent of each other.
When quantum probabilities ǫi are factorizable in the sense described by Eqs. (13), the payoff
relations (10) can also be interpreted in terms of playing a game that involves tossing a pair of
coins as follows. Consider a pair of biased coins that are tossed together. Either coin can land in
the head (H) or the tail (T ) state and for the pair we can define
ǫ1 = Pr(H,H), ǫ2 = Pr(H,T ), ǫ3 = Pr(T,H), ǫ4 = Pr(T, T ), (22)
as being the probabilities of the coins landing in the (H,H), (H,T ), (T,H), (T, T ) states, respec-
tively. Here, for instance, ǫ2 = Pr(H,T ) is the probability that the first coin (or Alice’s coin)
lands in the H state whereas the second coin (or Bob’s coin) lands in the T state. Now, referring
to the Eq. (20), p can then be interpreted as being the probability, in the joint toss of two coins,
that the first coin lands in the H state and, likewise, q can be interpreted as being the probability
that the second coin lands in the H state.
However, we are interpreting p and q as being the players’ strategies which means that a player
plays his/her strategy by changing the bias of the coin to which he/she is given access to. Also,
we notice that, for factorizable quantum probabilities, using Eqs. (13,20) we can write
ǫ1 = (ǫ1 + ǫ2)(ǫ1 + ǫ3), ǫ2 = (ǫ1 + ǫ2)(1− ǫ1 − ǫ3),
ǫ3 = (1− ǫ1 − ǫ2)(ǫ1 + ǫ3), ǫ4 = (1− ǫ1 − ǫ2)(1− ǫ1 − ǫ3). (23)
We now suggest another approach in considering the players’ payoffs (10) in the quantum game.
In view of the relations p = ǫ1 + ǫ2, q = ǫ1 + ǫ3, and the normalization constraint Σ
4
i=1ǫi = 1 we
can rewrite the payoffs (10) as
ΠA(UˆA, UˆB) = αǫ1 + βǫ2 + γǫ3 + δǫ4
= ǫ1(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)(ǫ1 + ǫ2) + (γ − δ)(ǫ1 + ǫ3) + δ
= ǫ1(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)p+ (γ − δ)q + δ,
ΠB(UˆA, UˆB) = αǫ1 + γǫ2 + βǫ3 + δǫ4
= ǫ1(α− β − γ + δ) + (γ − δ)p+ (β − δ)q + δ. (24)
We also note that the players’ payoffs (2) in the factorizable game can be expressed as
ΠA(p, q) = αpq + βp(1− q) + γ(1− p)q + δ(1− p)(1− q)
= pq(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)p+ (γ − δ)q + δ,
ΠB(p, q) = αpq + γp(1− q) + β(1− p)q + δ(1− p)(1− q)
= pq(α− β − γ + δ) + (γ − δ)p+ (β − δ)q + δ. (25)
Comparing Eqs. (25,24) we note that taking ǫ1 = pq makes the payoffs (24) equivalent to the
payoffs (25) in the factorizable game. That is, with players’ strategic variables being p = ǫ1 + ǫ2
and q = ǫ1+ ǫ3 and ǫ1 = pq, the players’ payoffs in the quantum game are reduced to their payoffs
in the factorizable game. Also, the product ǫ1 = pq takes the pair (p, q) to the interval [0, 1] and
is responsible for reducing the right sides of Eqs. (24) to the right sides of Eqs. (25).
This motivates considering ǫ1 as a function of the players’ independent strategic variables p and
q i.e. ǫ1 = ǫ1(p, q). It is a function of the players’ strategic variables p and q that maps the pair
(p, q) to the interval [0, 1]. Taking ǫ1 = ǫ1(p, q) allows us to consider forms of the function ǫ1(p, q)
that are different from the product pq. In turn, this permits departing from the factorizability
relations (13) and thus from the factorizable game.
We also note from Eqs. (24) that the function ǫ1 connects the two players’ payoffs together and
reminds us of the term γ representing the measure of entanglement in the players’ payoff relations
within the quantum game that is played in Eisert et al.’s scheme. We write the payoff relations
(24) for a non-factorizable game as
ΠA(p, q) = ǫ1(p, q)(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)p+ (γ − δ)q + δ,
ΠB(p, q) = ǫ1(p, q)(α− β − γ + δ) + (γ − δ)p+ (β − δ)q + δ, (26)
and consider it being the defining payoff relations for the non-factorizable game. Note that for
the quantum game the players’ strategies are unitary transformations UˆA and UˆB, whereas for
the new game defined by payoff relations (26) the players’ strategies are p, q ∈ [0, 1]. Also, the
two players’ payoffs are linked together via the function ǫ1 = ǫ1(p, q). The game defined by the
payoff relations (26) makes no reference to the quantum operations and can thus simply be called
a non-factorizable game or a game that permits non-factorizable probabilities.
With Eqs. (26) being the defining payoff relations for our non-factorizable game, an immediate
question would be what are the restrictions on the type of functions ǫ1(p, q). To determine this,
we note that the permissible ranges of the players’ payoffs in Eqs. (26) and Eqs. (10) must be
identical. In view of the right sides of Eqs. (10), we put Eqs. (26) in the following form
ΠA(p, q) = αǫ1(p, q) + β [p− ǫ1(p, q)] + γ [q − ǫ1(p, q)] + δ [ǫ1(p, q)− (p+ q) + 1] ,
ΠB(p, q) = αǫ1(p, q) + γ [p− ǫ1(p, q)] + β [q − ǫ1(p, q)] + δ [ǫ1(p, q)− (p+ q) + 1] ,
(27)
and for the right sides of these equations to be identical to the right sides of Eqs. (10) we require
ǫ1(p, q) ≤ p, ǫ1(p, q) ≤ q, ǫ1(p, q) ≤ p+ q. (28)
Note that the right sides of the payoff relations (27) are equivalent to the right sides of the payoff
relations (10) in the quantum game. This can be confirmed as follows. Referring to Eqs. (26), we
notice that for given p, q ∈ [0, 1] as players’ independent strategies, the function ǫ1(p, q) gives a
value in [0, 1], the functions ǫ2(p, q) and ǫ3(p, q) can then be defined as
ǫ2(p, q) = p− ǫ1(p, q), ǫ3(p, q) = q − ǫ1(p, q),
ǫ4(p, q) = 1− [(p+ q)− ǫ1(p, q)]. (29)
When the restrictions (28) hold, the functions ǫ2(p, q), ǫ3(p, q), ǫ4(p, q) produce values within
the range [0, 1]. Of course, the function ǫ1(p, q) = pq, which results in the factorizable game,
satisfies these requirements. In view of the restrictions (28), and a non-factorizable game for
which ǫ1(p, q) 6= pq, we require the function ǫ1(p, q) to be restricted by the following condition
ǫ1(p, q) ≤ pq. (30)
Examples of the functions that satisfy this requirement include ǫ1(p, q) = (pq)
2 and ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q3,
amongst others.
Note that, in view of (28), the range of function ǫ1(p, q) and the values assigned to p and q,
as being players’ strategies, are in the interval [0, 1]. In this case, Eqs. (29) generate values for
ǫ2(p, q), ǫ3(p, q), ǫ4(p, q) in the range [0, 1]. Also, Eqs. (29) show that
4∑
i=1
ǫi(p, q) = 1, and thus
ǫi(p, q) are probabilities for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4. The converse is also true. That is, for given values for
four normalized probabilities ǫi (1 ≤ i ≤ 4) using Eq. (20) we can determine values for p and q as
being p = ǫ1 + ǫ2 and q = ǫ1 + ǫ3.
Nash equilibria for the game with non-factorizable probabilities
The pair of strategies (p∗, q∗) defining Nash equilibria are obtained from the inequalities
ΠA(p
∗, q∗)−ΠA(p, q
∗) ≥ 0, ΠB(p
∗, q∗)−ΠB(p
∗, q) ≥ 0, (31)
which, for the game (26), can be written as
ΠA(p
∗, q∗)−ΠA(p, q
∗) = [ǫ1(p
∗, q∗)− ǫ1(p, q
∗)] (α− β − γ + δ) + (p∗ − p)(β − δ) ≥ 0,
ΠB(p
∗, q∗)−ΠB(p
∗, q) = [ǫ1(p
∗, q∗)− ǫ1(p
∗, q)] (α− β − γ + δ) + (q∗ − q)(β − δ) ≥ 0.
(32)
For ǫ1(p, q) = pq these equations are reduced to Eqs. (4). For ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q2 the inequalities (32)
give
ΠA(p
∗, q∗)−ΠA(p, q
∗) = (p∗ − p)
[
q∗2(p∗ + p)(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)
]
≥ 0,
ΠB(p
∗, q∗)−ΠB(p
∗, q) = (q∗ − q)
[
p∗2(q∗ + q)(α − β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)
]
≥ 0,
(33)
and, likewise, for ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q3 the inequalities (32) give
ΠA(p
∗, q∗)−ΠA(p, q
∗) = (p∗ − p)
[
q∗3(p∗ + p)(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)
]
≥ 0,
ΠB(p
∗, q∗)−ΠB(p
∗, q) = (q∗ − q)
[
p∗2(q∗2 + qq∗ + q2)(α− β − γ + δ) + (β − δ)
]
≥ 0,
(34)
Now consider the situation when the strategy pair (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) exists as a NE. As it is apparent
from Eqs. (4) that for ǫ1(p, q) = pq the pair (p
∗, q∗) = (1, 1) exists as NE when (α − γ) ≥ 0. For
ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q2 and the pair (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) we obtain
ΠA(1, 1)− ΠA(p, 1) = (1− p) [(α − γ)(1 + p) + p(−β + δ)] ≥ 0,
ΠB(1, 1)−ΠB(1, q) = (1− q) [(α− γ)(1 + q) + q(−β + δ)] ≥ 0, (35)
and thus (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) exists as a NE when, in addition to (α−γ) ≥ 0, we also have (δ−β) ≥ 0.
For ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q3 and the same pair (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) we obtain
ΠA(1, 1)−ΠA(p, 1) = (1− p) [(α− γ) + p(α− β − γ + δ)] ≥ 0,
ΠB(1, 1)−ΠB(1, q) = (1− q)
[
(α− γ) + (q + q2)(α − β − γ + δ)
]
≥ 0. (36)
That is, when both (α−γ) ≥ 0 and (δ−β) ≥ 0 are true, we have the strategy pair (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1)
existing as a NE for the both cases i.e. when ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q2 and p2q3.
In this approach in extending a game from its classical mixed-strategy version to a non-classical
version, the players’ strategies involve one parameter for each i.e. p and q ∈ [0, 1]. We now refer
to Eisert et al.’s quantum version of the same game [9, 10] in which players’ payoff relations in
the quantized version of the game involve one- and two-parameter strategy sets (5,6). As in
our non-classical extension of a classical game the players have one-parameter strategy sets, it
is appropriate to compare our non-classical extension above to the quantum version of Eisert et
al. [9,10] when it involves one-parameter strategy sets. To achieve this, and with reference to the
game (1), we recast quantum game of Eisert et al. with one-parameter strategy set in form of
the non-classical game above. From Ref. [10] we note that the players’ payoffs for one-parameter
strategy set are
ΠA(θA, θB) = α |cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
+ β |sin(θB/2) cos(θA/2)|
2
+
γ |cos(θB/2) sin(θA/2)|
2
+ δ |sin(θA/2) sin(θB/2)|
2
, (37)
ΠA(θA, θB) = α |cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
+ γ |sin(θB/2) cos(θA/2)|
2
+
β |cos(θB/2) sin(θA/2)|
2
+ δ |sin(θA/2) sin(θB/2)|
2
. (38)
Comparing Eqs. (27) with Eqs. (37,38) and noticing that 0 ≤ θ ≤ π whereas p, q ∈ [0, 1], we define
p = θA/π, q = θB/π and
ǫ1(p, q) = |cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
, p− ǫ1(p, q) = |sin(θB/2) cos(θA/2)|
2
,
q − ǫ1(p, q) = |cos(θB/2) sin(θA/2)|
2
, ǫ1(p, q)− (p+ q) + 1 = |sin(θA/2) sin(θB/2)|
2
,
(39)
from which one obtains
p = cos2(θA/2), q = cos
2(θB/2), ǫ1(p, q) = pq, (40)
and that gives us the factorizable game as discussed just before the Eq. (26). This shows that Eisert
et al.’s quantum game with one-parameter strategy set, is identical to the classical factorizable
game. For the same quantum game with two-parameter strategy set (6), the players’ payoffs are
obtained as
ΠA(θA, φA; θB, φB) = α |cos(φA + φB) cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
+
β |cos(φA) cos(θA/2) sin(θB/2)− sin(φB) sin(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2 +
γ |sin(φA) cos(θA/2) sin(θB/2)− cos(φB) sin(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
+
δ |sin(φA + φB) cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2) + sin(θA/2) sin(θB/2)|
2
. (41)
As was the case for one-parameter strategy set, we now compare Eqs. (27) with Eqs. (41,38).
Recall that 0 ≤ θ ≤ π and 0 ≤ φ ≤ π/2 whereas p, q ∈ [0, 1] we obtain
ǫ1(p, q) = |cos(φA + φB) cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
,
p− ǫ1(p, q) = |cos(φA) cos(θA/2) sin(θB/2)− sin(φB) sin(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
,
q − ǫ1(p, q) = |sin(φA) cos(θA/2) sin(θB/2)− cos(φB) sin(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|
2
,
ǫ1(p, q)− (p+ q) + 1 = |sin(φA + φB) cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2) + sin(θA/2) sin(θB/2)|
2
, (42)
and using these equations, p and q can then be expressed in terms of θA, φA, θB, φB i.e.
p = p(θA, φA; θB, φB), q = q(θA, φA; θB, φB). (43)
That is, the two-parameter payoff relations can be expressed in the form of (27) but this comes
at the price that the players’ strategic veriables p and q are not local anymore. For the quantum
game with a one-parameter set of strategies, this is indeed the case as we have p = p(θA, φA) and
q = q(θA, φA).
Conclusion
We suggest a direct route to obtaining a non-factorizable game from a classical factorizable game
while taking into consideration the quantum probabilities and the players’ strategic variables. We
explore how a quantum game can be considered as a non-factorizable game by considering the
scheme of Eisert et al. for quantization of a bimatrix game that involves four quantum probabil-
ities. When these probabilities are factorizable in a specific sense, as described by Eqs. (13), the
quantum game attains the interpretation of a mixed-strategy classical game. This paper presents
two approaches in obtaining bimatrix games with non-factorizable probabilities. Our first ap-
proach discusses a non-factorizable probability distribution in which the non-factorizability is
controlled by an external parameter k.
We note that the relations p = ǫ1 + ǫ2 and q = ǫ1 + ǫ3 as obtained from the factorizability
constraints (13) are apparently the simplest expressions connecting the players’ strategies p and
q to the quantum probabilities ǫi (1 ≤ i ≤ 4). However, this does not mean that these are the
only possible expressions that are consistent with the factorizability constraints (13). There can
be other possible cases, for instance, when p = p(ǫi) and q = q(ǫi) i.e. both p and q are functions
of all four quantum probabilities ǫi (1 ≤ i ≤ 4). In such a case, the factorizability constraints will
take the following form
ǫ1 = p(ǫi)q(ǫi), ǫ2 = p(ǫi) [1− q(ǫi)] , ǫ3 = [1− p(ǫi)] q(ǫi), ǫ4 = [1− p(ǫi)] [1− q(ǫi)] , (44)
and, depending on how the functions p = p(ǫi) and q = q(ǫi) are defined, the analysis will lead
to a different outcome of the quantum game. Essentially, in this paper we use the factorizability
constraints (13) to obtain such functions that express players’ strategies in terms of the probabil-
ities ǫi and there can be more than one possible ways of doing that and each way has to respect
the requirement that when ǫi are factorizable, now in the sense of Eqs. (44), the quantum game
reduces itself to the classical mixed-strategy game.
This paper addresses several questions relevant to the quantization scheme proposed by Eisert
et al. in 1999. This scheme motivated other quantization schemes and has been the basis of a
large number of research articles that have followed since then along this line of research. By
systematically discussing the structure of the payoff relations obtained in this scheme, and its
relation to the corresponding classical mixed-strategy factorizable game, this paper presents an
understanding of the role of quantum probabilities, factorizability of a probability distribution, and
the nature of the players’ strategic variables. We provide a perspective by which a non-factorizble
game is obtained directly from a classical factorizable game by defining a function ǫ1(p, q) that
satisfyies certain constraints. The quantum game of Eisert et al. involving one parameter strategy
set is explained as the classical factorizable game. We then study functions ǫ1(p, q) = (pq)
2 and
ǫ1(p, q) = p
2q3 that satisfy these constraints and lead to non-factorizable games. We determine the
corresponding Nash equlibria. We then ask whether the quantum game with two-parameter set
of strategies can be considered as a non-factorizable game for a particular choice of the function
ǫ1(p, q). We find that this can be achieved but it comes at a significant cost that the players’
strategic veriables p and q do not remain local anymore. This is indeed the case for the quantum
game with one-parameter set of strategies for which the players’ strategic variables p and q are
definable in terms of local variables i.e. p = p(θA, φA) and q = q(θA, φA).
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